



[10191/3910]

**IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES**

In re Application of: _____ X
Doerte EIMERS-KLOSE et al. :
For: GATEWAY UNIT FOR CONNECTING :
SUB-NETWORKS, IN PARTICULAR :
IN VEHICLES :
Filed: October 21, 2005 : Art Unit: 2142

Serial No.: 10/535,486

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on

Date: *5/19/08*

Signature: *AARON C. DEDITCH*

(33,865)

APPEAL BRIEF PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 41.37

SIR:

In the above-identified patent application ("the present application"), Appellants mailed a Notice Of Appeal on December 14, 2007 (it was filed on December 17, 2007) from the Final Office Action issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on August 31, 2007, so that the two-month appeal brief due date was February 17, 2008, which has been extended by three (3) months to May 19, 2008 (May 17, 2008 was a Saturday) by the accompanying Transmittal and Petition to Extend.

In the Final Office Action, claims 8 to 14 were finally rejected. A Response After a Final Office Action was mailed on October 31, 2007, and an Advisory Action was mailed on November 27, 2007.

It is understood for purposes of the appeal that any Amendments to date have already been entered by the Examiner, and that the Response After Final does not require entry since it included no amendments.

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As to the length of the "concise explanation" of the subject matter defined in each of the claims involved in the appeal (see 41.37), the "concise explanation" language is like the "concise explanation" requirement of former Rule 37 C.F.R. § 1.192. Accordingly, the length of the concise explanation provided is acceptable, since it would have been acceptable under 37 C.F.R. § 1.192 and since it specifically defines the subject matter of the independent claims involved and in the appeal. In the filing of many appeal briefs under the old rule for the present Assignee, the length of the "concise explanation" has always been ultimately accepted by the Patent Office.

It is therefore respectfully submitted that this Appeal Brief complies with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37. Although no longer required by the rules, this Brief is submitted in triplicate as a courtesy to the Appeals Board.

It is respectfully submitted that the final rejections of claims 8 to 14 should be reversed for the reasons set forth below.

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1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

The real party in interest in the present appeal is Robert Bosch GmbH ("Robert Bosch") of Stuttgart in the Federal Republic of Germany. Robert Bosch is the assignee of the entire right, title and interest in the present application.

2. RELATED APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES

There are no interferences or other appeals related to the present application, which "will directly affect or be directly affected by or have a bearing on the Board's decision in the pending appeal".

3. STATUS OF CLAIMS

CLAIMS 1 TO 7 ARE CANCELED.

A. Claims 8 to 14 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over International Publication No. WO 01/26337 to "Gelvin et al.".

Appellants therefore appeal from the final rejections of pending claims 8 to 14. A copy of all of the pending and appealed claims 8 to 14 is attached hereto in the Claims Appendix.

4. STATUS OF AMENDMENTS

In response to the Final Office Action mailed on August 31, 2007, Appellants filed a Response After A Final Office Action (with no amendments), which was mailed on October 31, 2007.

It is understood for purposes of the appeal that any Amendments to date have already been entered by the Examiner, and that the Response After Final does not require entry since it included no amendments.

5. SUMMARY OF CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER

The concise explanation of the summary of the claimed subject matter is as follows, as described in the context of the present application.

As in claims 8 and 14, the specification and Figures disclose and describe the following:

The “Background Information” section explains that to make new services possible in modern vehicles, communication among the control units located in different bus segments is indispensable. Such communication requires the different bus segments to be connected to one another via one or more gateway units. A gateway unit connecting two bus segments has the function of relaying messages received on one bus segment to another bus segment (routing). The complexity of such a gateway unit increases with the number of bus segments to be connected. (See specification, page 1, lines 6 to 11). The gateway units via which different buses are connected are configured (for example, via tables). As a result, pure message routing to one other segment does not require a change in the software. However, if the type and number of connected bus segments change, major changes are needed, in which not only the existing configuration tables must be adapted, but the entire software must be rewritten to meet the new requirements. *The complexity of the central configuration and the routing software thus increases significantly with the number of connected bus segments.* (See specification, page 1, lines 16 to 22).

The presently claimed subject matter provides the benefit of a particularly elegant and secure modular design of a gateway unit, in which a gateway incorporated in the software (logical software gateway) is responsible for routing messages between exactly two subnets. This makes it possible to expand gateways without need for changing the existing gateway software and/or the existing configuration tables. (See specification, page 1, lines 25 to 28). *Furthermore, such a modular gateway allows error limitation. This is because if a gateway is not operational, then the other gateways continue to perform their functions independently of the defective gateway.* (See specification, page 2, lines 4 to 6).

As to claim 8, it is to a device for connecting subnets in a vehicle including a gateway unit configured to connect at least two subsystems. In this regard, the specification discloses that Figure 1 shows a gateway unit 10, which is connected to three bus segments 1, 2, 3 and has the function of routing messages from one bus segment to one or both of the other bus segments. (See specification, page 4, lines 1 to 3 and Fig. 1).

As to claim 8, it also includes the feature in which the gateway unit is made of at least one modular software gateway, which routes messages between only two subnets. In this regard, the specification discloses that Figure 1 shows modular gateways (logical software gateways) 12, 13, 23, such a gateway being responsible for routing messages between exactly two subnets. Gateway 12 thus routes messages from 1 to 2 and vice-versa; gateway 13 routes messages from 1 to 3 and vice-versa, and gateway 23 routes messages from 2 to 3 and vice-versa. Each logical software gateway thus describes an individual connection pathway between two subnets, i.e., bus segments. (See specification, page 4, lines 3 to 8 and Fig. 1).

As to claim 14, it is to a device for connecting subnets in a vehicle including a gateway unit configured to connect at least two subsystems. In this regard, the specification discloses that Figure 1 shows a gateway unit 10, which is connected to three bus segments 1, 2, 3 and has the function of routing messages from one bus segment to one or both of the other bus segments. (See specification, page 4, lines 1 to 3 and Fig. 1).

As to claim 14, it also includes the feature in which the gateway unit is integrated in a control unit having an application system and is provided in one layer of a communication system of the vehicle. In this regard, Figure 5 shows a gateway integrated in a control unit using a layer model. (See specification, page 3, line 31 and Fig. 5). In particular, Figure 5 shows the layer model of a control unit 100, in which a CAN-CAN gateway is integrated. Three layers 1, 2, 3 are illustrated, a driver 102 being provided for the low-speed CAN and a driver 104 being provided for the high-speed CAN in a first layer. Furthermore, additional objects are introduced into network layer 3 (CAN layer 3) which communicate with applications A, B, and C via receiving and transmitting objects Rx3 and Tx3. These additional objects buffer the messages if needed and add or remove protocol-specific parameters. The logical software gateway which is integrated into this layer (CAN-CAN) routes messages from one bus to another. Receiving and transmitting objects Rx2 and Tx2

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are used as described above for routing messages between the two CAN buses. They represent the interfaces between the layers (See specification, page 3, line 34 to page 4 line 10 and Fig. 5).

As to claim 14, it also includes the feature in which the gateway unit includes at least one modular software gateway, the logical gateway connecting only two subsystems. In this regard, the specification discloses that Figure 1 shows modular gateways (logical software gateways) 12, 13, 23, such a gateway being responsible for routing messages between exactly two subnets. Gateway 12 thus routes messages from 1 to 2 and vice-versa; gateway 13 routes messages from 1 to 3 and vice-versa, and gateway 23 routes messages from 2 to 3 and vice-versa. Each logical software gateway thus describes an individual connection pathway between two subnets, i.e., bus segments. (See specification, page 4, lines 3 to 8 and Fig. 1).

In summary, the presently claimed subject matter is to a device for connecting subnets in a vehicle, including a gateway unit configured to connect at least two subsystems, in which the gateway unit is made of at least one modular software gateway, which routes messages between only two subnets. (See claim 8).

In summary, the presently claimed subject matter is also to a device for connecting subnets in a vehicle including a gateway unit configured to connect at least two subsystems, the gateway unit being integrated in a control unit having an application system and being provided in one layer of a communication system of the vehicle, the gateway unit including at least one modular logical gateway, the logical gateway connecting only two subsystems. (See claim 14).

Finally, the appealed claims include no means-plus-function language and no step-plus-function claims, so that 37 C.F.R. 41.37(v) is satisfied as to its specific requirements for such claims, since none are present here. Also, the present application does not contain any step-plus-function claims because the method claims in the present application are not "step plus function" claims because they do not recite "a step for", as required by the Federal Circuit and as stated in Section 2181 of the MPEP.

6. GROUNDS OF REJECTION TO BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL

A. Whether claims 8 to 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are unpatentable over International Publication No. WO 01/26337 to “Gelvin et al.”.

7. ARGUMENT

A. The Obviousness Rejections of Claims 8 to 14

Claims 8 to 13

Claims 8 to 14 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over International Publication No. WO 01/26337 to “Gelvin et al.”. The responses to date are incorporated by reference, as appropriate.

To reject a claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Office bears the initial burden of presenting a *prima facie* case of obviousness. *In re Rijckaert*, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1955, 1956 (Fed. Cir. 1993). To establish *prima facie* obviousness, three criteria must be satisfied. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation to modify or combine reference teachings. *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988). This teaching or suggestion to make the claimed combination must be found in the prior art and not based on the application disclosure. *In re Vaeck*, 947 F.2d 488, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

Also, as clearly indicated by the Supreme Court in *KSR*, it is “important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the [prior art] elements” in the manner claimed. *See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.*, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). In this regard, the Supreme Court further noted that “rejections on obviousness cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” *Id.*, at 1396. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. *In re Merck & Co., Inc.*, 800 F.2d 1091, 231 U.S.P.Q. 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Third, the prior art reference(s) must

teach or suggest all of the claim features. *In re Royka*, 490 F.2d 981, 180 U.S.P.Q. 580 (C.C.P.A. 1974).

Still further, to reject a claim as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the prior art must disclose or suggest each claim feature and it must also provide a motivation or suggestion for combining the features in the manner contemplated by the claim. (See Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 296 (1990); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 834 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). Thus, the “problem confronted by the inventor must be considered in determining whether it would have been obvious to combine the references in order to solve the problem”, Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps, Inc., 850 F.2d 675, 679 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Still further, the prior art must disclose or suggest each claim feature and it should also provide a motivation or suggestion for combining the features in the manner contemplated by the claim. (See Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 296 (1990); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 834 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). Thus, the “problem confronted by the inventor must be considered in determining whether it would have been obvious to combine the references in order to solve the problem”, Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps, Inc., 850 F.2d 675, 679 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Claim 8 provides for “a gateway unit configured to connect at least two subsystems, wherein the gateway unit is made of at least one modular software gateway, which routes messages between *only two subnets*.¹” These software gateways only route information between two networks. In this regard, the specification in the present application explains that because the modular software gateways route information between only two subnets “[i]f each subnet is to be connected to each other subnet, $N*(N-1)/2$ logical software gateways are needed, where variable N is the number of subnets in the overall system. Thus, for three subnets, there will be three logical software gateways; for four subnets there will be six, and for five subnets there will be ten logical software gateways.” (See specification pg. 4, lines 20 to 23).

It is respectfully submitted that the features of claim 8 are not disclosed nor even suggested by the “Gelvin” reference. In fact, Fig. 2 in “Gelvin” only indicates that a single gateway node 104 is connected to a multiplicity of nodes, including node 3, node 4, node 7,

and the internet. The Final Office Action cites IP Router 502 as “at least one modular logical gateway”, and cites Figure 3 as showing “the logical gateway connecting exactly two subsystems.” However, page 12, lines 23 to 25 in “Gelvin” refer to gateway 302 as having the “ability to control the flow of information between vehicle networks [at least 2] and between these networks and external networks [at least 2]”. The Final Office Action also asserts that since the “only gateway referred to previously in Gelvin is gateway 302,” it follows that “gateway 302 reads on the claimed gateway unit and the IP router 502 reads on the ‘at least one modular gateway’ included in the gateway unit.”

However, Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 in “Gelvin” refer to gateway unit 104. The “Gelvin” reference therefore does not disclose that the IP Router 502 corresponds to the Gateway 302. Regardless, the features of claim 8 are not disclosed nor suggested by the “Gelvin” reference because as the Final Office Action has acknowledged “Gelvin does not explicitly teach routing messages between only two subnetworks.”

As explained herein, the modular software gateways described in the present application only route information between two networks. While the “Gelvin” reference refers to an IP Router 502 that can route messages between an IDB-C bus 504, 100 Base TX Ethernet 506, and an IEEE 1394 bus 508, therefore IP Router 502 routes messages between *three* networks. As explained above, because the modular software gateways route information between only two subnets, three software gateway modules are necessary to combine three networks. The “Gelvin” reference does not refer to three software gateways equivalent to the three modular software gateways, as provided for in claim 8, that would be required to connect three networks.

In the Final Office Action it is asserted that “the claims do not require three software gateways so it is not clear why the applicant is making an allegation that Gelvin does not teach three software gateways.” However, as explained above claim 8 provides for modular software gateways which route information between only two networks and at least three of such modular software gateways would be required to connect three networks, as described in the specification at pg. 4, lines 20 to 23. Therefore, IP Router 502 does not correspond to and does not disclose the modular software gateways, as provided for in the context of the presently claimed subject matter.

The Advisory Action cites MPEP section 2144.04 (II) to show that “even though Gelvin routes messages to more than two subnetworks, it is obvious to assume that Gelvin can route between only two modular software gateways”. However, MPEP section 2144.04 (II) specifically states “the omission of an element and its function is obvious if the function of the element is not desired”. Therefore, the Final Office Action’s assertion that “if one of the networks taught by Gelvin is not needed, then it would not be desired and thus obvious to omit” is not reasonable because the network connections are desired.

The difference between the “Gelvin” reference and the presently claimed subject matter in this context is not the number of connected subnetworks, but the nature (and therefore number) of the modular software gateways which connect the subnetworks. In this regard, the Final Office Action has acknowledged that “Gelvin” does not disclose any elements that correspond to a modular software gateway for routing messages between only two subnetworks., as provided for in the context of the presently claimed subject matter.

Accordingly, claim 8 is allowable since the reference does not disclose nor even suggest the feature of “at least one modular software gateway which routes messages between only two subnets,” as provided for in the context of the claimed subject matter.

Claims 9 to 13 depend from claim 8, and are therefore allowable for at least the same reasons as claim 8.

Claim 14

Claim 14 includes features like those of claim 8 and is therefore allowable for essentially the same reasons.

Still further, claim 14 includes the feature of “a gateway unit configured to connect at least two subsystems, the gateway unit being integrated in a control unit having an application system and being provided in one layer of a communication system of the vehicle, the gateway unit including at least *one modular logical gateway*, the logical gateway connecting *only two subsystems*.” The Final Office Action admits that “Gelvin does not explicitly teach routing messages between only two subnetworks.” Therefore, the features of claim 14 are not disclosed nor suggested by the “Gelvin” reference, including for the reasons explained herein.

Accordingly, claim 14 is allowable since the reference does not disclose nor even suggest the feature of “at least *one modular logical gateway*, the logical gateway connecting *only two subsystems*,” as provided for in the context of the claimed subject matter.

Accordingly, claims 8 to 14 are allowable.

As further regards all of the obviousness rejections of the claims, *the presently claimed subject matter provides the benefit the benefit of a particularly simple and secure modular design of a gateway unit, in which a gateway incorporated in the software (logical software gateway) is responsible for routing messages between exactly two subnets. This makes it possible to expand gateways without need for changing the existing gateway software and/or the existing configuration tables.* (See specification, page 1, lines 25 to 28). Furthermore, such a modular gateway allows error limitation, because if a gateway is not operational, the other gateways continue to perform their functions independently of the defective gateway. (See specification, page 2, lines 4 to 6). Accordingly, the claimed subject matter is not obvious since its benefits are evidence of non-obviousness as to the reference as applied.

As further regards each of the obviousness rejections, it is respectfully submitted that the cases of In re Fine, supra, and In re Jones, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992), make plain that the Office's generalized assertions that it would have been obvious to modify or combine the references do not properly support a § 103 rejection. It is respectfully submitted that those cases make plain that the Answer reflects a subjective “obvious to try” standard, and therefore does not reflect the proper evidence to support an obviousness rejection based on the references relied upon. In particular, the Court in the case of In re Fine stated that:

The PTO has the burden under section 103 to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness. It can satisfy this burden only by showing some objective teaching in the prior art or that knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art would lead that individual to combine the relevant teachings of the references. This it has not done. . . .

Instead, the Examiner relies on hindsight in reaching his obviousness determination. . . . One cannot use hindsight

reconstruction to pick and choose among isolated disclosures in the prior art to deprecate the claimed invention.

In re Fine, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1598 to 1600 (citations omitted; italics in original; emphasis added). Likewise, the Court in the case of In re Jones stated that:

Before the PTO may combine the disclosures of two or more prior art references in order to establish *prima facie* obviousness, there must be some suggestion for doing so, found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. . . .

Conspicuously missing from this record is any evidence, other than the PTO's speculation (if it be called evidence) that one of ordinary skill . . . would have been motivated to make the modifications . . . necessary to arrive at the claimed [invention].

In re Jones, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1943, 1944 (citations omitted; italics in original).

That is exactly the case here since it is believed and respectfully submitted that the Office Actions to date and the Answer offer no evidence whatsoever, but only conclusory hindsight, reconstruction and speculation, which these cases have indicated does not constitute evidence that will support a proper obviousness finding. Unsupported assertions are not evidence as to why a person having ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to modify or combine references to provide the claimed subject matter of the claims to address the problems met thereby. Accordingly, the Office must provide proper evidence of a motivation for modifying or combining the references to provide the claimed subject matter.

Also, the Federal Circuit in the case of In re Kotzab has made plain that even if a claim concerns a “technologically simple concept” — which is not the case here — there still must be some finding as to the “specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of a skilled artisan” that would motivate a person having no knowledge of the claimed subject matter to “make the combination in the manner claimed,” stating that:

In this case, the Examiner and the Board fell into the hindsight trap. The idea of a single sensor controlling multiple valves, as opposed to multiple sensors controlling multiple valves, is a technologically simple concept. With this simple concept in mind, the Patent and Trademark Office found prior art statements that in the abstract appeared to suggest the claimed limitation. But, there

was no finding as to the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with no knowledge of Kotzab's invention to make the combination in the manner claimed. In light of our holding of the absence of a motivation to combine the teachings in Evans, we conclude that the Board did not make out a proper *prima facie* case of obviousness in rejecting [the] claims . . . under 35 U.S.C. Section 103(a) over Evans.

In re Kotzab, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). Here again, there have been no such findings to establish that the features discussed above of the rejected claims are met by the reference relied upon. As referred to above, any review of the reference, whether taken alone or combined, makes plain that the reference simply does not describe the features discussed above of the rejected claims.

Thus, the proper evidence of obviousness must show why there is a suggestion as to the reference so as to provide the subject matter of the claimed subject matter and its benefits.

In short, there is no evidence that the reference relied upon, whether taken alone or otherwise, would provide the features of the claims discussed above. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the claims are allowable for these reasons.

As still further regards all of the obviousness rejections of the claims, it is respectfully submitted that a proper *prima facie* case has not been made in the present case for obviousness, since the Office Actions to date never made any findings, such as, for example, regarding in any way whatsoever what a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been at the time the claimed subject matter of the present application was made. (See In re Rouffet, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (the “factual predicates underlying” a *prima facie* “obviousness determination include the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, and the level of ordinary skill in the art”)). It is respectfully submitted that the proper test for showing obviousness is what the “combined teachings, knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, and the nature of the problem to be solved as a whole would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art”, and that the Patent Office must provide particular findings in this regard — the evidence for which does not include “broad conclusory statements standing alone”. (See In re Kotzab, 55 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1313, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing In re Dembiczak, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614, 1618

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(Fed. Cir. 1999) (obviousness rejections reversed where no findings were made “concerning the identification of the relevant art”, the “level of ordinary skill in the art” or “the nature of the problem to be solved”))). It is respectfully submitted that there has been no such showings by the Office Actions to date or by the Advisory Action.

In fact, the present lack of any of the required factual findings forces both Appellants and any Appeals Board to resort to unwarranted speculation to ascertain exactly what facts underly the present obviousness rejections. The law mandates that the allocation of the proof burdens requires that the Patent Office provide the factual basis for rejecting a patent application under 35 U.S.C. § 103. (See *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 U.S.P.Q. 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing *In re Warner*, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016, 154 U.S.P.Q. 173, 177 (C.C.P.A. 1967))). In short, the Examiner bears the initial burden of presenting a proper prima facie unpatentability case — which has not been met in the present case. (See *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24, U.S.P.Q.2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).

Accordingly, claims 8 to 14 are allowable.

CONCLUSION

In view of the above, it is respectfully requested that the rejections of the finally rejected claims 8 to 14 be reversed, and that these claims be allowed as presented.

Dated: 5/19/2008

Respectfully submitted,

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CLAIMS APPENDIX

- 1-7. (Canceled).
8. A device for connecting subnets in a vehicle, comprising:
a gateway unit configured to connect at least two subsystems, wherein the gateway unit is made of at least one modular software gateway, which routes messages between only two subnets.
9. The device as recited in claim 8, wherein at least three subnets are connected to the gateway unit, the gateway unit including a plurality of modular software gateways, each of the modular software gateways routing messages between only two subsystems.
10. The device as recited in claim 8, further comprising:
bus-specific receiving objects configured to relay incoming messages to selected software gateways, the bus-specific receiving objects being provided for each subnet.
11. The device as recited in claim 10, wherein the receiving objects include routing tables in which a treatment of incoming messages is configured.
12. The device as recited in claim 8, further comprising:
bus-specific transmitting objects configured to monitor access to a particular bus, for each subnet.
13. The device as recited in claim 8, wherein the modular software gateway is configured to buffer incoming messages and perform protocol-specific adaptations.
14. A device for connecting subnets in a vehicle comprising:
a gateway unit configured to connect at least two subsystems, the gateway unit being integrated in a control unit having an application system and being provided in one layer of a communication system of the vehicle, the gateway unit including at least one modular logical gateway, the logical gateway connecting only two subsystems.

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EVIDENCE APPENDIX

Appellants have not submitted any evidence pursuant to 37 CFR Sections 1.130, 1.131 or 1.132, and do not rely upon evidence entered by the Examiner.

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RELATED PROCEEDINGS INDEX

There are no interferences or other appeals related to the present application.